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INDIGENT DEFENSE OR INDIGENT OFFENSE? THE UNASHAMED 
JURISPRUDENCE OF BARRING RELIEF FOR DEATH-SENTENCED 
INMATES BASED UPON “GARDEN-VARIETY” INEFFECTIVENESS 
OF COUNSEL 
MARK E. OLIVE* 
INTRODUCTION 
“[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, 
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is 
provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.”1 
This truth has not been obvious in capital state post-conviction and federal 
habeas corpus proceedings. The law has crept from no right to counsel in 
capital post-conviction proceedings to a statutory right. While many, if not 
most, attorneys who handle such cases are highly competent and dedicated, 
they do not have to be under Supreme Court precedent. A person today may be 
executed due to his or her attorney’s mistakes and incompetence. We should 
demand the provision of effective counsel in life or death proceedings. 
I.  THE CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION PROCESS 
Capital and other state criminal cases generally follow a nine-step process, 
illustrated here: 
  
 
* Mark E. Olive is an attorney in private practice in Tallahassee, Florida, who was an invited 
speaker at the 2016 Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture at Saint Louis University School of 
Law. This article is an expanded version of some of Mr. Olive’s comments about indigent 
defense in capital post-conviction cases. Mr. Olive has been involved in representation of 
individuals facing the death penalty at trials, on appeals, and in post-conviction proceedings since 
1980. 
 1. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
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After trial and direct appeal (Steps 1–3), a capitally sentenced defendant may 
seek relief from constitutional violations like state suppression of material, 
exculpatory evidence,2 juror misconduct,3 and the ineffectiveness of trial 
counsel4 by filing a petition for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 
2254 (Steps 7–9). However, if there is an available state court remedy for the 
alleged violation, then the petitioner is required to file first in state court to 
“exhaust” the claim (Steps 4–6).5 Once a claim is exhausted and relief is 
finally denied in state court, it is ripe for federal habeas corpus review (Steps 
7–9). 
 
 2. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 3. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 440 (2000). 
 4. Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 5. Presenting a claim in state court is called “exhausting” the claim. This is required by 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). See also Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (stating that 
the exhaustion rule is grounded in “comity concerns”; “[t]he purpose of exhaustion is . . . [to] 
afford the State a full and fair opportunity to address and resolve the [federal] claim on the 
merits.”). 
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II.  FUNDING FOR COUNSEL IN CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS 
In the 1970s and 1980s, there was little to no funding for state and federal 
post-conviction representation. What was provided in capital cases was on a 
pro bono basis by attorneys, law firms, and non-profit organizations.6 Now all 
states with the death penalty, except Alabama and Georgia,7 provide counsel in 
capital post-conviction proceedings (Steps 4–7) via legislation, not as a matter 
of constitutional right.8 
There was no federal right to counsel in capital habeas corpus proceedings 
(Steps 7–9) until 1988 when Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act.9 With 
this Act, Congress provided petitioners who seek to have their convictions and 
death sentences vacated in proceedings under sections 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 (state 
judgment) or 2255 (federal judgment), but are financially unable to obtain 
adequate representation, with “the appointment of one or more attorneys.”10 In 
Martel v. Clair,11 the Court addressed Congress’s § 3599 concerns and 
intentions: 
The new statute grants federal capital defendants and capital habeas petitioners 
enhanced rights of representation, in light of what it calls ‘the seriousness of 
the possible penalty and . . . the unique and complex nature of the litigation.’ 
§ 3599(d) (2006 ed.). . . . And the statute aims in multiple ways to improve the 
quality of representation afforded to capital petitioners and defendants alike.12 
Congress intended “to promote effective representation” in these proceedings, 
a goal § 3599 fulfills in “myriad ways.”13 
 
 6. See Mark E. Olive, Capital Post-Conviction Representation Models: Lessons from 
Florida, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L 277 (2007) (hereinafter Post-Conviction Counsel). 
 7. See Steven H. Pollak, Stop Ga. Death Penalty Until Problems Solved, Report Says: ABA 
Study Cites Habeas Issues, Jury Confusion, LAW.COM (Feb. 1, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/ar 
ticle.jsp?id=1138701911792 [https://perma.cc/G9NY-FTDJ]. See also Barbour v. Haley, 471 
F.3d 1222, 1223–24 (11th Cir. 2006); A.B.A. EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE 
DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE GEORGIA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT 151 (2006), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/assessmentproject/georgia/ 
report.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8ER-YVEZ]. 
 8. Pollak, supra note 7. 
 9. 21 U.S.C § 848(q) was the portion of the Act that provided for counsel in capital §§ 2254 
and 2255 cases. It was moved to 18 U.S.C § 3599 by the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 222, 120 Stat. 192, 231 (2006). 
 10. 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (formerly 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)). 
 11. 132 S. Ct. 1276 (2012). 
 12. Id. at 1284–85 (interpreting former statute 21 U.S.C. § 848(q), which was “repealed and 
recodified without change at 18 U.S.C. § 3599” Harbison v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1481, 1489 (2009)). 
The Supreme Court has recognized “this statute grants indigent capital defendants a mandatory 
right to qualified legal counsel.” McFarland. v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 854 (1994) (emphasis 
added). 
 13. Martel, 132 S. Ct. at 1285. The enhanced representation includes: requiring lawyers to 
have more experience than 18 U.S.C. § 3006(A) demands in non-capital cases; higher rates of 
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III.  EFFECTIVE INDIGENT DEFENSE – COUNSEL SHOULD NOT DISAPPEAR OR 
BE EXTRAORDINARILY (RATHER THAN SIMPLY NORMALLY) INEFFECTIVE 
While counsel are now required for almost all death-sentenced inmates in 
post-conviction proceedings, all that counsel must do (with largely only one 
exception) is not disappear—not “abandon” the petitioner. This egregiously 
low bar for the performance of counsel creates an intolerable risk that 
individuals will be executed despite, at best, prejudicial constitutional 
violations at the state trial and appeal and, at worst, being actually innocent or 
wrongfully sentenced to death. 
Capital post-conviction representation is complex, intensely time-
consuming, and “brimming with traps for the unwary.”14 A series of cases 
from the Supreme Court in the last sixteen years has exposed the level of 
dysfunction and non-existent lawyering in many of these life-or-death cases, 
but has left a baffling and deeply unsatisfying jurisprudence for correcting the 
patent injustices. 
A. Supreme Court Approaches to Bad Lawyering 
1. Default and “Cause” to Excuse Them in Federal Courts 
A federal district court may decline to address the merits of a claim that 
was inexcusably “defaulted” by the petitioner in state court proceedings. A 
federal “default” question generally involves an evaluation of whether and how 
a claim for relief was presented to and considered by a state court. If a claim in 
a federal habeas corpus petition was not presented, or not fully presented, to a 
 
compensation (“in part to attract better counsel”) than § 3006(A) allows; and “more money for 
investigative and expert services.” Id. 
 14. Post-Conviction Counsel, supra note 6, at 280 (for a non-exclusive list of the chores of 
effective counsel, see id. at 281–83). “[Q]uality legal representation is necessary in capital habeas 
corpus proceedings in light of ‘the seriousness of the possible penalty and . . . the unique and 
complex nature of the litigation.’” McFarland, 512 U.S. at 855 (emphasis added) (quoting former 
21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(7)). “[O]ur carefully crafted doctrines of waiver and abuse of the writ make it 
especially important that the first petition adequately set forth all of a state prisoner’s colorable 
grounds for relief.” McFarland, 512 U.S. at 860 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (emphasis added); see also id. at 855–56 (majority opinion); ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE 
APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, Guideline 
1.1 and accompanying commentary (rev. ed. 2003), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/migrated/2011_build/death_penalty_representation/2003guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JDA4-T3XK], reprinted at 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003) (“Post-judgment 
proceedings demand a high degree of technical proficiency, and the skills essential to effective 
representation differ in significant ways from those necessary to succeed at trial. . . . Habeas 
corpus actions are governed by a complex set of procedural rules”) [hereinafter ABA 
GUIDELINES]; ABA GUIDELINES, Guideline 10.15.1 and accompanying commentary (“The field 
is increasingly complex and ever-changing.”). 
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state court, it may be considered procedurally defaulted.15 In addition, a claim 
that was presented to a state court, but not in the manner that the state court 
normally and regularly requires that it be presented (e.g., an untimely 
presentation of the claim), and the state court invokes its state rule to bar 
consideration of the claim,16 a “default” issue arises. 
Whether there is a default, and whether a default will be excused so a 
district court can reach the federal constitutional merits of a claim, are issues 
which require considerable analysis and possibly even the taking of evidence.17 
Even if there has been an enforceable default, a petitioner may receive merits 
review of a claim in federal court if he or she can demonstrate “cause” for and 
“prejudice” from the default. Cause is established, inter alia, where 
trial/appellate counsel were ineffective (Steps 1 and 2).18 Even otherwise 
“unexcused” defaults must be ignored by district courts when to enforce a 
default would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.19 
 
 15. If a state court remedy remains available, it is possible in some instances to obtain a stay 
of federal proceedings while the petitioner returns to state court to present the new claim. See 
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005). 
 16. This is called a procedural default. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 82–83 (1977). 
In order for there to be this type of a default, the state court’s ruling (a) must not be based upon 
the federal constitution (that is, the state ruling must be “independent”), and (b) must be based 
upon an adequate state ground. Id. at 81. Imposition by the state of a procedural bar, and federal 
court recognition of that bar, is 
subject to our standards for assessing the adequacy of independent state procedural 
grounds to bar all consideration of claims under the national Constitution. . . . In any 
given case . . . the sufficiency of a rule to limit all review of a constitutional claim itself 
depends upon the timely exercise of the local power to set procedure. “Novelty in 
procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by 
those who, in justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of 
their federal constitutional rights.” 
Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 423 (1991) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Only a “‘firmly 
established and regularly followed state practice’ may be interposed by a State to prevent 
subsequent review by [a federal court] of a federal constitutional claim.” Id. at 423–24 (citation 
omitted). 
 17. Whether there exists an independent and adequate state court basis for barring a claim is 
decided by the district court, and “[w]hether a petitioner’s actions have created a state law 
procedural bar is a mixed question of law and fact.” Hansbrough v. Latta, 11 F.3d 143, 144–45 
(11th Cir. 1994). Despite a state court finding regarding default, the federal court must make an 
independent finding. Macklin v. Singletary, 24 F.3d 1307, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 1994) (default is a 
de novo determination). 
 18. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 725 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 
(1986); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535–36 (1986). 
 19. For example, if the evidence and claims reveal that constitutional errors “probably 
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent,” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 
(1986), or that the state court process “‘has probably resulted’” in capital punishment for one who 
is “‘actually innocent’ of a death sentence,” Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 411 n.6 (1989), no 
procedural default can prevent relief for the petitioner. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 317 (1995) 
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2. Coleman v. Thompson – No Ineffectiveness “Cause” to Excuse a 
Default 
It is unclear whether states must provide collateral or post-conviction 
review of criminal judgments,20 but the Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania v. 
Finley21 there is no constitutional right to an attorney in collateral attacks on 
convictions and sentences: “We have never held that prisoners have a 
constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks upon their 
convictions, and we decline to so hold today. Our cases establish that the right 
to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.”22 
In Coleman v. Thompson,23 the Court reaffirmed its holding in Finley and 
held that because there is no right to an attorney in post-conviction 
proceedings, there is no right to the effective assistance of counsel in such 
proceedings.24 Accordingly, the ineffective assistance of counsel in state post-
conviction proceedings (Steps 4 and 5) could not constitute cause to excuse a 
procedural default at Step 7.25 
Coleman argued that deficient performance by state post-conviction 
counsel should constitute “cause” allowing federal courts to consider defaulted 
claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel because, under 
Virginia law, state post-conviction proceedings were the first time that a 
petitioner could raise such claims. Coleman’s counsel had raised ineffective 
claims properly in the state circuit court (Step 4) but then unreasonably failed 
 
(“[i]f the habeas court were merely convinced that [the] new facts raised sufficient doubt about 
[petitioner’s] guilt to undermine confidence in the result of the trial without the assurance that that 
trial was untainted by constitutional error, [the petitioner’s] threshold showing of innocence 
would justify a review of the merits of the constitutional claims”). The petitioner raises sufficient 
doubt if he or she establishes that it is more likely than not that, in light of the new evidence, no 
juror “conscientiously obey[ing] the instructions of the trial court” would have voted to find him 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 329. See also Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 346–47 
(1992) (the “innocence of the death penalty” inquiry “must focus on those elements which render 
a defendant eligible for the death penalty”); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 12 (1992) 
(“[a] habeas petitioner’s failure to develop a claim in state-court proceedings will be excused and 
a hearing mandated if he can show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from 
failure to hold a federal evidentiary hearing.”); Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1183 (11th 
Cir. 1991) (petitioner must show “that he is ineligible for the death penalty”). 
 20. See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 337 (1965) (granting certiorari to consider whether 
a constitutional right to state post-conviction review exists, but dismissing the grant after 
Nebraska adopted a comprehensive state post-conviction review scheme). But cf. Murray v. 
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality opinion) (“State collateral proceedings are not 
constitutionally required . . . .”); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554–55 (1987) (plurality 
opinion) (similar). 
 21. Finley, 481 U.S. 551. 
 22. Id. at 555 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Murray, 492 U.S. at 10. 
 23. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). 
 24. Id. at 752. 
 25. Id. at 752–53. 
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to properly assert those claims in an appeal to the higher state court (Step 5). 
The Supreme Court found that it need not answer the question of whether there 
would be an exception to Finley for claims that could be raised for the first 
time in post-conviction proceedings because Coleman’s attorney had presented 
Coleman’s ineffective assistance claims on his first opportunity to do so in the 
state trial court. The Court found that Coleman was not, in fact, alleging a right 
to counsel at his “first” opportunity to assert a constitutional right, but at a 
subsequent appellate stage, and this was clearly prohibited under Finley.26 
Thus, Coleman left open the question whether a prisoner has a right to 
effective counsel in collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion to 
raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial. 
3. Martinez v. Ryan – “Cause” to Excuse the Default of an 
Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel Claim Can be Shown by the 
Ineffectiveness of Post-Conviction Counsel 
This question was resolved in Martinez v. Ryan,27 but only with respect to 
one issue—the ineffective representation by trial counsel. In Martinez, post-
conviction counsel filed a “Notice of Post-Conviction Relief” necessary to 
initiate proceedings in Arizona, but later filed with the court a statement 
asserting that she could find no colorable claims for relief.28 In subsequent 
federal habeas corpus proceedings, Martinez argued that he had a federal 
constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
effective assistance of counsel in initial-review collateral proceedings in state 
court with respect to claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel because it 
was his first opportunity to raise such claims. Martinez further argued that 
because he received ineffective assistance in his initial-review collateral 
proceedings in state court (Step 4), he had established “cause” sufficient to 
excuse the default of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims, and 
allow the federal court to review them on their merits (Step 7) even though the 
claims never were presented to the state courts. 
The Supreme Court refused to find that the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments required states to provide effective assistance of counsel to 
inmates in state post-conviction proceedings. But the Court held that 
ineffective assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings (Step 
4) could establish “cause” allowing the federal court (Step 7) to review the 
merits of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial (Step 1), if it was 
shown that state post-conviction counsel’s deficient performance was the 
reason the claim was not properly presented to the state court.29 
 
 26. Id. at 755. 
 27. Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 
 28. Id. at 1314. 
 29. Id. at 1313, 1315. 
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The Court distinguished its holding in Coleman because Coleman’s 
ineffective assistance claims were defaulted on appeal from his initial-review 
collateral proceeding, and therefore his claims had been addressed initially on 
the merits by the state circuit court that first addressed his post-conviction 
petition.30 The Court emphasized that the difference between Coleman’s case 
and Martinez’s was that to enforce the default in Martinez’s case would mean 
that no state court would ever hear his claims.31 
The Court held that in order to establish “cause” under Martinez a 
petitioner must demonstrate that counsel in his initial-review collateral 
proceedings were ineffective under Strickland v. Washington32—that post-
conviction counsel acted contrary to prevailing professional norms and that, 
but for counsel’s unreasonable actions, the results would have been different.33 
The petitioner must also demonstrate that the underlying claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel “is a substantial one.”34 
Martinez imposed on counsel appointed to represent a federal habeas 
petitioner the duty to investigate, develop, and present—and imposed on 
federal courts the duty to address—“claim[s] of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel when an attorney’s errors (or the absence of an attorney) caused a 
procedural default in an initial-review collateral proceeding.”35 Federal counsel 
must litigate and federal courts must resolve whether initial-review 
proceedings in state court “may not have been sufficient to ensure that proper 
consideration was given to a substantial claim” because petitioner’s state post-
 
 30. Id. at 1316. 
 31. Id. The Court further emphasized that in Arizona state law required that ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claims be brought in the first instance in collateral proceedings, rather 
than on direct appeal. Id. at 1317. The Court noted that “[w]here, as here, the initial-review 
collateral proceeding is the first designated proceeding for a prisoner to raise a claim of 
ineffective assistance at trial, the collateral proceeding is in many ways the equivalent of a 
prisoner’s direct appeal as to the ineffective-assistance claim.” Id. These principles were further 
addressed in Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013). 
 32. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 33. Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. 
 34. Id. (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)). The Court emphasized that its 
ruling was an equitable ruling, not a constitutional ruling. Id. at 1319. A constitutional ruling, the 
Court reasoned, would create a free-standing constitutional claim, require the appointment of 
counsel in every initial-review collateral proceeding, mandate the same system of appointing 
counsel in every state, and would require reversal in every case in which the state’s system for 
appointing counsel for initial-review collateral proceedings “did not conform to the constitutional 
rule.” Id. An equitable ruling, on the other hand, would allow states to maintain a variety of 
systems for appointing counsel in collateral proceedings, and even allow them the option to 
forego appointing counsel all together. Id. at 1319–20. Should a state choose the latter course, it 
either could not assert procedural default in federal habeas proceedings in defense of a state court 
decision, or it could simply argue the defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not 
“substantial” and, therefore, not cognizable under Martinez. Id. at 1320. 
 35. Id. at 1318. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2017] INDIGENT DEFENSE OR INDIGENT OFFENSE? 753 
conviction counsel were constitutionally ineffective.36 The need for effective 
assistance of counsel at this initial-review collateral proceeding is especially 
acute because “the prisoner is in no position to develop the evidentiary basis 
for a claim of ineffective assistance, which often turns on evidence outside the 
trial record,” and “the right to [effective trial] counsel is the foundation for our 
adversary system” and “a bedrock principle in our justice system.”37 This 
bedrock principle was used to distinguish, and single out for special treatment, 
violations of the Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel-at-trial claims from other 
significant violations which are found to be defaulted by federal courts.38 The 
Court stressed it was creating only a “limited qualification” to Coleman.39 
4. Maples v. Thomas – Abandonment by Counsel as “Cause” to Excuse a 
Procedural Default 
Mr. Maples was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Alabama.40 
Following his conviction, two attorneys from a major law firm, acting pro 
bono, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in state court.41 Before the 
petition was decided, the two attorneys left the firm without telling Mr. Maples 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1317 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)). The Court found 
that, when a State deliberately chooses to move “trial-ineffectiveness claims” from direct appeal 
where counsel is constitutionally guaranteed, it “significantly diminishes prisoners’ ability to file 
such claims.” Id. at 1318. In the context of this kind of state procedural framework, “counsel’s 
ineffectiveness in an initial-review collateral proceeding qualifies as cause for a procedural 
default,” and, “as an equitable matter,” allows “a federal habeas court to hear [otherwise 
defaulted] . . . claim[s] of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.” Id. 
 38. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317–18. 
 39. Id. at 1319. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, noted: 
There is not a dime’s worth of difference in principle between those cases and many other 
cases in which initial state habeas will be the first opportunity for a particular claim to be 
raised: claims of “newly discovered” prosecutorial misconduct, for example, see Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), claims based on “newly 
discovered” exculpatory evidence or “newly discovered” impeachment of prosecutorial 
witnesses, and claims asserting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The Court’s 
soothing assertion, ante, at 1320, that its holding “addresses only the constitutional claims 
presented in this case,” insults the reader’s intelligence. 
Id. at 1321. 
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to review an extension of Martinez: 
[Whether] the rule established in Martinez v. Ryan and Trevino v. Thaler, that ineffective 
state habeas counsel can be seen as cause to overcome the procedural default of a 
substantial ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, also applies to procedurally 
defaulted, but substantial, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims? 
Davila v. Davis, 650 F. App’x 860 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 580 U.S. 2 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017) 
(No. 16-6219). 
 40. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 916 (2012). 
 41. Id. 
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and without requesting to withdraw.42 The trial court later denied the petition 
and sent the notice of its denial to the two attorneys who were no longer at the 
firm, and the firm returned the notice unopened.43 Maple’s deadline for 
appealing the denial passed.44 
New attorneys moved the trial court to reissue the order and restart the 
appeal clock.45 The trial court refused, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals 
denied a petition for mandamus for leave to file an out-of-time appeal, and the 
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.46 Maples sought federal habeas corpus 
relief, but the federal district court denied his request based on the procedural 
default in state court, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.47 
The Supreme Court noted that “negligent conduct” by an attorney “agent” 
would not provide “cause” to excuse a default.48 The Supreme Court reversed, 
however, holding that the abandonment of Maples by his attorneys provided 
“cause” to excuse the procedural default in state court.49 “Cause” for excusing 
a procedural default exists where something external to the defendant impeded 
his ability to comply with the state’s procedural rule.50 The Court held that the 
attorneys’ abandonment of Maples severed their agency relationship so the 
failure to appeal could not be attributed to Maples.51 Maples was “left without 
any functioning attorney,”52 which provided cause to excuse his procedural 
default. 
B. Holland v. Florida – Equitable Tolling of the AEDPA Statute of 
Limitations for Exceptional Circumstances – Attorney Misconduct 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) is 
the federal statutory scheme under which habeas corpus petitions are 
adjudicated.53 Under the AEDPA there is a one year statute of limitations for 
filing a federal habeas corpus petition.54 Lawyers cannot seem to manage to 
 
 42. Id. at 916–17. 
 43. Id. at 917. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 917. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 922. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Maples, 132 S. Ct. at 923. 
 51. Id. at 917. 
 52. Id. at 927. 
 53. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 54. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2014). The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of 
state collateral review. § 2244(d)(2) (“The time during which a properly filed application for State 
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is 
pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”). 
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count to 365.55 In Holland v. Florida, the Eleventh Circuit held that a lawyer’s 
gross negligence of not timely filing a federal habeas petition, absent a finding 
of “bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental impairment or so forth on the 
lawyer’s part,”56 could never warrant equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of 
limitations. The Supreme Court held this “standard [was] too rigid”57 and 
equitable tolling was available if a petitioner “shows ‘(1) that he has been 
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance 
stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.”58 In Mr. Holland’s case, his 
lawyers’ egregious actions, and Holland’s due diligence, raised sufficient 
questions about equitable tolling to warrant a remand.59 
Absent “extraordinary circumstances,” however, habeas corpus petitioners 
must live with and die for attorney ineffectiveness.60 “[G]arden variety” 
ineffectiveness by counsel is forgiven.61 
 
 55. Jonathan Atkins, Danielle B. Rosenthal & Joshua D. Weiss, The Inequities of AEDPA 
Equitable Tolling: A Misapplication of Agency Law, 68 STAN. L. REV. 427, 431, n. 13 (2016) (as 
of 2014, “[s]ince Congress passed AEDPA in 1996, lawyers for at least eighty petitioners 
sentenced to death have missed the statute’s one-year filing deadline for federal habeas review.”) 
 56. Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 2549 (2010). 
 57. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (2010). 
 58. Id. at 2562 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). 
 59. With respect to extraordinary circumstances, the Court held: 
Here, Collins [appointed counsel] failed to file Holland’s federal petition on time despite 
Holland’s many letters that repeatedly emphasized the importance of his doing so. Collins 
apparently did not do the research necessary to find out the proper filing date, despite 
Holland’s letters that went so far as to identify the applicable legal rules. Collins failed to 
inform Holland in a timely manner about the crucial fact that the Florida Supreme Court 
had decided his case, again despite Holland’s many pleas for that information. And 
Collins failed to communicate with his client over a period of years, despite various pleas 
from Holland that Collins respond to his letters. . . . 
Id. at 2564. 
With respect to due diligence, the Court held: 
Here, Holland not only wrote his attorney numerous letters seeking crucial information 
and providing direction; he also repeatedly contacted the state courts, their clerks, and the 
Florida State Bar Association in an effort to have Collins—the central impediment to the 
pursuit of his legal remedy—removed from his case. And, the very day that Holland 
discovered that his AEDPA clock had expired due to Collins’ failings, Holland prepared 
his own habeas petition pro se and promptly filed it with the District Court. 
Id. at 2565. On remand, the district court granted equitable tolling. Order Following November 
18, 2010 Status Conference Requiring Filing of Amended Petition and Setting Briefing Schedule, 
Holland v. Florida, 1:06-CV-20182 (S.D. Fla., Nov. 22, 2010). 
 60. Id. at 2562. 
 61. Id. at 2564. 
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C. Substitution of Counsel in Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings – 
Conflicts of Interest 
At times an appointed federal capital attorney seeks to withdraw from his 
or her appointment, or the petitioner seeks new counsel. In Clair, supra, the 
Supreme Court held that general, run-of-the-mill withdrawal and substitution 
motions under § 3599, based upon disagreements between counsel and client, 
are controlled by an “interest of justice” standard.62 However, withdrawal and 
substitution motions premised on a conflict of interest were different: “the 
court would have to appoint new counsel if the first lawyer developed a 
conflict.”63 The district court judge in Clair had noted: “[n]o conflict of interest 
. . . is shown.”64 
But if a conflict of interest is shown, then counsel must be removed, as the 
Court later held in Christeson v. Roper.65 Mr. Christeson was convicted of 
murder and sentenced to death.66 After additional state proceedings, under the 
one-year statute of limitations imposed by the AEDPA, his federal habeas 
petition was due on April 10, 2005.67 Nine months before the deadline, the 
District Court appointed attorneys to represent Mr. Christeson.68 The attorneys 
did not meet with Mr. Christeson until more than six weeks after his petition 
was due and filed the petition 117 days late.69 They justified their failure to 
meet with Mr. Christeson and timely to file his habeas petition on a simple 
miscalculation of the AEDPA limitations period.70 The federal district court 
dismissed the petition as untimely.71 
Seven years later, these attorneys contacted new attorneys who filed a 
motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) seeking to reopen the 
district court’s final judgment on the ground that the AEDPA’s statute of 
 
 62. Martel v. Clair, 132 S. Ct. 1276, 1287 (2012). The Court explained “interest of justice”: 
As its name betrays, the “interests of justice” standard contemplates a peculiarly context-
specific inquiry. So we doubt that any attempt to provide a general definition of the 
standard would prove helpful. In reviewing substitution motions, the courts of appeals 
have pointed to several relevant considerations. Those factors may vary a bit from circuit 
to circuit, but generally include: the timeliness of the motion; the adequacy of the district 
court’s inquiry into the defendant’s complaint; and the asserted cause for that complaint, 
including the extent of the conflict or breakdown in communication between lawyer and 
client (and the client’s own responsibility, if any, for that conflict). 
Id. 
 63. Clair, 132 S. Ct. at 1286 (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. at 1282. 
 65. Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891 (2015). 
 66. Id. at 892. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Christeson, 135 S. Ct at 892. 
 71. Id. 
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limitations should have been equitably tolled.72 Because previous counsel 
could not litigate their own failures, Mr. Christeson requested substitute 
counsel.73 The District Court denied the motion for substitution, and the Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed.74 
The Supreme Court reversed: 
Tolling based on counsel’s failure to satisfy AEDPA’s statute of limitations is 
available only for “serious instances of attorney misconduct.” Holland v. 
Florida, 560 U. S. 631, 651–652 (2010). Advancing such a claim would have 
required [counsel] to denigrate their own performance. Counsel cannot 
reasonably be expected to make such an argument, which threatens their 
professional reputation and livelihood. See Restatement (Third) of Law 
Governing Lawyers §125 (1998). Thus, as we observed in a similar context in 
Maples v. Thomas, 565 U. S. ___, ______, n. 8 (2012) (slip op., at 17, n. 8), a 
“significant conflict of interest” arises when an attorney’s “interest in avoiding 
damage to [his] own reputation” is at odds with his client’s “strongest 
argument—i.e., that his attorneys had abandoned him.”75 
The Supreme Court found “Christeson might properly raise a claim for relief 
pursuant to Rule 60(b),”76 arguing that prior counsel’s conduct provided a 
basis for equitable tolling. The Court relied on Maples,77 a case about “cause” 
for procedural defaults, not about equitable tolling.78 Mr. Christeson lost on 
remand and was executed.79 
 
 72. Id. at 892. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) entitles the moving party to relief from 
judgment on several grounds, including the catch-all category “any other reason that justifies 
relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) (2016). To be granted, a motion under subsection (b)(6) requires, 
inter alia, a showing of “extraordinary circumstances.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 
(2005). Federal courts are split on whether the decision in Martinez is an “extraordinary 
circumstance” that could warrant Rule 60(b) relief under Gonzalez. 
 73. Christeson, 135 S. Ct at 892. 
 74. Id. at 893. 
 75. Id. at 894. Initial federal counsel “abandoned” Mr. Christeson: 
[Counsel] failed to meet with Christeson until more than six weeks after his petition was 
due. There is no evidence they communicated with their client at all during this time. 
They finally filed the petition on August 5, 2005–117 days too late. . . . A legal ethics 
expert . . . stated in a report submitted to the District Cout: “[I]f this is not abandonment, I 
am not sure what would be.” 
Id. at 892 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 76. Id. at 895. 
 77. Id. at 894. 
 78. Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 917 (2012). Even though Maples was a “cause” to 
excuse a procedural default case, and Holland, supra, was an equitable tolling of the AEDPA 
statute of limitations case, some courts have held that Maples effectively overruled Holland. See 
Atkins, supra note 54, at 438. Since Holland and Maples, courts of appeals have taken different 
approaches on whether only abandonment may satisfy the extraordinary circumstances for 
equitable tolling. Id. at 439. Several circuits have held that “a range of attorney misconduct not 
limited to abandonment,” govern the extraordinary circumstances inquiry. Luna v. Kernan, 784 
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D. The Operation of 18 U.S.C. § 3599 and Abandonment 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3599(e), attorneys appointed in federal capital habeas 
corpus proceedings are required to continue to represent the petitioner even 
when the case has completed (Step 9), i.e., after federal habeas corpus has been 
denied, the denial has been affirmed, and a petition for writ of certiorari has 
been denied: 
Unless replaced by similarly qualified counsel upon the attorney’s own motion 
or upon motion of the defendant, each attorney so appointed shall represent the 
defendant throughout every subsequent stage of available judicial proceedings, 
including pretrial proceedings, trial, sentencing, motions for new trial, appeals, 
applications for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
and all available post-conviction process, together with applications for stays 
of execution and other appropriate motions and procedures, and shall also 
represent the defendant in such competency proceedings and proceedings for 
executive or other clemency as may be available to the defendant.80 
“Under § 3599(e), a lawyer appointed to represent a capital defendant is 
obligated to continue representing his client until a court of competent 
jurisdiction grants a motion to withdraw.”81 Unfortunately some attorneys and 
clerks are unaware of this requirement.82 
 
F.3d 640, 648 (9th Cir. 2015). See also Ross v. Sarano, 712 F.3d 784, 800 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(recognizing “an attorney’s malfeasance” may warrant tolling); Whiteside v. United States, 775 
F.3d 180, 185 (4th Cir. 2014) (characterizing Holland as a case of “extraordinary negligence”); 
Schmid v. McCauley, 825 F.3d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 2016) (applying Christeson, holding that 
abandonment “is one potentially extenuating circumstance” supplying the requisite extraordinary 
circumstances). Others have espoused a categorical position that attorney abandonment is needed. 
See Thomas v. Atty. Gen., Florida, 795 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2015); Rivas v. Fischer, 687 
F.3d 514, 538 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Maples); Mack v. Falk, 509 F. App’x 756, 759 (10th Cir. 
2013) (identifying abandonment under Maples as providing the extraordinary circumstances for 
tolling); United States v. Wheaton, 826 F.3d 843, 852 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding no abandonment 
and thus no extraordinary circumstances for tolling); Sneed v. Shinseki, 737 F.3d 719, 727 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013) (construing Maples to have clarified the extraordinary circumstances analysis in tolling 
cases). 
 79. Christeson v. Griffith, 845 F.3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir. 2017); Jim Salter, Missouri 
executes man for killing woman, 2 children in 1998, WASH. TIMES, http://www.washingtontimes. 
com/news/2017/jan/31/missouri-inmate-faces-execution-for-killing-family/ [https://perma.cc/J2 
KN-UNNB]. 
 80. 18 U.S.C. § 3599(e) (2012). 
 81. Battaglia v. Stephens, 824 F.3d 470, 474 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 82. The following letter was sent to a client who had appointed counsel for federal habeas 
corpus purposes: 
As I have explained before, I was appointed to represent you before the United States 
federal courts. My representation of you ended with the conclusion of the case before the 
United States Supreme Court, when your request for issuance of a writ of certiorari was 
denied. I am told by the Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
that my court appointed representation does not continue into state court matters. 
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[CJA counsel] expressly stated that he believes that his representation does not 
extend to state competency proceedings. This belief is mistaken. Under § 
3599(e), counsel “shall represent the defendant throughout every subsequent 
stage of available judicial proceedings, . . . and shall also represent the 
defendant in such competency proceedings and proceedings for executive or 
other clemency as may be available to the defendant.83 
“We conclude that [CJA counsel] “abandoned” Battaglia for purposes of 
pursuing a Ford claim.”84 The Court concluded it had jurisdiction to enter a 
stay of Mr. Battaglia’s execution, appoint new counsel, and conduct further 
proceedings even though this case had completed the nine-step process.85 
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REQUIRE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
FEDERAL AND STATE POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL IN CAPITAL CASES 
Martinez, Holland, and Maples represent progress in policing the 
performance of counsel in capital post-conviction proceedings. But, they 
insulate shabby representation in hundreds of cases. Other than for a claim of 
trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, appointed post-conviction counsel in capital 
cases are not accountable to their clients or the courts for what they do 
unreasonably and prejudicially wrong. Absent disappearing, evaporating as 
counsel, not functioning at all, or being extraordinarily (as opposed to 
ordinarily) incompetent, these post-conviction attorneys’ conduct binds a death 
sentenced client’s hands and seals their fate. This is unconscionable. 
Proof of an utterly unconstitutional trial or sentencing, negligently not 
raised at Step 4, will not be heard at Step 7. A lawyer’s failure timely to file a 
federal petition (Step 7) will not be corrected unless counsel utterly abandoned 
their clients. Death-sentenced inmates have been and will continue to be 
executed without any review of substantial claims for relief. 
This is not indigent defense; it is indigent offense. It is shameful that a 
thing called “ordinary, run-of-the-mill, garden variety, attorney neglect and 
ineffectiveness” in post-conviction proceedings operates to bar condemned 
 
Nevertheless, if you wish to challenge this death sentence, please write to the District 
Court and to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and ask for the appointment of a lawyer 
to continue to represent you in the state courts. Again, I provide you with the address to 
both of these courts below. 
A copy of the letter is on file with the author. 
 83. Battaglia, 824 F.3d at 474. “Competency proceedings” are proceedings pursuant to Ford 
v. Wainwright, 477 US 399 (1986), where the Supreme Court held that death sentenced inmates 
had to be mentally competent at the time of execution. See id. at 474–75. 
 84. Id. at 474. 
 85. Id. at 474–75. “Battaglia effectively lacked counsel to prepare his claim of 
incompetency. In our view, it would be improper to approve his execution before his newly 
appointed counsel has time to develop his Ford claim. A stay is needed to make Battaglia’s right 
to counsel meaningful.” Id. at 475. 
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persons from challenging their convictions and sentences. The fact that there is 
“garden variety” ineffectiveness means there is a lot of ineffectiveness going 
around. What civilized system of law has an entire category for incompetence 
called “ordinary” that must be tolerated? 
These condemned petitioners cannot receive appointed counsel of choice 
and cannot be expected to understand and navigate the shoals of post-
conviction and habeas corpus jurisprudence when even their protectors’ 
ignorance and incompetence is excused. An attorney’s ineffectiveness should 
not be the obstacle to hearing a (1) substantial claim of any constitutional error; 
(2) a petitioner’s defense to a missed statute of limitations; or (3) any other 
substantial argument in favor of vacating the state court death judgment. The 
illusion of counsel cannot be allowed to make judges and the public 
comfortably numb. Ordinary failures when it comes to executing people should 
be ferreted out and corrected, not embraced as an institutional reason not to 
listen. 
 
 
 
